After the release of ISIS's 'Salil Al-Sawarem' promotional and motivational video with its famous religious chant, hundreds of Arab YouTubers started mocking it by editing its chant and including it in funny dancing clips which they called 'the popular edition'. Also, some Arabic and Kurdish TV channels produced shows that aimed at mocking the radical group. Since ISIS regards dancing as a religious taboo, these popular and official media productions represent a cultural resistance force and a rejection of ISIS and its extremist ideology. I argue in this article that these active involvements in ridiculing, countering, and discrediting the terrorists' ideology are cultural resistance efforts that aim at countering terrorism and raising awareness about its dangers in the Middle East region.
Introduction
ISIS is regarded now as one of the wealthiest and deadliest terrorist organizations on earth. 1 In its 'Salil Al-Sawarem' (The Clinging of the Swords) promotional videos, the group employs highly graphic scenes and images which can be easily found on YouTube; they mainly highlight ISIS's savage vision of control, featuring military victories, beheading scenes, mass killings, assassination attempts, and suicide attacks. This article investigates the kind of cultural resistance ISIS encounters in many Middle Eastern countries by examining a number of famous TV shows and popular YouTube videos.
In this context, it is important to refer to one of the foundations of ISIS's extremist ideology which is built on spreading fear. The idea is borrowed from an earlier AlQaeda publication entitled 'The Administration of Savagery'. The work was written by a jihadist called Abu Bakr Naji and was posted online around 2004. 2 The document offers detailed predictions of the Islamic State establishment, but that in order to achieve it, savagery and chaos must overwhelm. In this regard, acting savagely and portraying savagery must be continuously done and in a way justified by Islamic jurisdiction in order to make Muslims feel vulnerable and seek the help of mujahideen to gain peace.
Naji mentions that 'even though the jihadis will have caused the chaos, that fact will be forgotten as the fighters impose security, provide food and medical treatment, and establish Islamic courts of justice'. 3 He also asserts a media committee or division must be established that should persuade the masses 'to join the jihad, offer positive support, and adopt a negative attitude toward those who do not join the ranks. 4 In other words, the target audience is the general public who must be informed about the alleged credibility of ISIS's action and its savagery, both of which must be justified based on Islamic sharia. One example of the above view is documented back in 2012. The spokesperson of the group, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, once participated in a meeting near Aleppo with representatives from different Islamist factions fighting in Syria in order to find a solution to the ongoing military confrontations amongst them. An agreement was reached to form an Islamic religious council in order to end the feuds based on Islamic law. However, Adnani merely looked at them disdainfully. He then said: 'The only law I believe in is the law of the jungle.' 5 This kind of thinking is similar to that of Al-Qaeda, which routinely emphasized the following messages in their public communication: an Islamist Utopia, they are attacking us, jihad is the only just response, terrorism is a legitimate tactic in jihad, and the glory of martyrdom. 6 Indeed, 'Salil Al-Sawarem' is one of these media productions that embodies ISIS's vision of savagery whose goal is to create fear and promote ISIS's brand as a frightful group.
It is important here to closely examine the link between terrorism and propaganda because they are connected to the overreaching concepts covered in this study. According to Jowett and O'Donnell, propaganda refers to the 'deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and divert behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist'.
7 Religious authorities and political institutions in different times relied on media to consolidate their powers though media was also used by opposing parties and groups to undermine the hegemony of the powerful groups. Media can also be complicit if it promotes 'terrorism by stressing fear and an uncertain future '. 8 In this regard, G. Weimann emphasizes the link between terrorism and propaganda as follows:
Terrorists see the media as a powerful tool in their psychological warfare. They believe that fear and panic can be spread by the coverage of terrorist attacks. They also look at the media as instruments of propaganda, targeting various audiences as they can create awareness (on a global scale) of the problems and issues motivating them. They can use terrorist attacks to promote their cause on the media agenda and thus on the public agenda, they can turn to their own people seeking legitimacy, support, and funding and even recruit new members.
The mass media are a valuable instrument in terrorist strategy, and consequently in terrorist tactics too.
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Jowett and O'Donnell believe that religion and propaganda are often related since the role of propaganda in the spread of different religions cannot be ignored. For example, they have both 'relied on the use of charismatic figures, heavy symbolism, a simple and incessant moral philosophy, and an understanding of their audience's needs. 10 From the early stages of ISIS's emergence as an extremist terrorists group, it has been actively using propaganda to promote its vision and goals.
11 In this regard, communication, technology, and new media are the best tools that ISIS is using to reach its public and possibly create an impact on some audience segments.
For many decades, propaganda has been used as a resource for mobilization for many terrorists groups and in different world regions. 12 According to a number of nineteenthcentury Italian anarchists such as Errico Malatesta, Carlo Cafiero and Emilio Covelli, terrorism was understood to be 'propaganda by the deed'. 13 Another anarchist theorist called Peter Kropotkin said that 'By actions which compel general attention, the new idea seeps into people's minds and wins converts. One such act may, in a few days, make more propaganda than thousand pamphlets. Above all, it awakens the spirit of revolt'.
14 In other words, 'propaganda by the deed' refers to the idea that only powerful or important deeds can draw peoples' attention to a group's cause. 15 Hence, there is always a need for mediated violence in order for a terrorist group to thrive. Garrison asserts that the terrorist act, in and of itself, communicates that change can occur and the violence of the act commands the attention of the society. The propaganda effect is in the act of securing the attention of the populous and then providing the message through the violence.
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According to Schmid, 17 terrorism serves three main purposes: intimidation, blackmail and propaganda. In fact, many scholars equate terrorism and propaganda, for they 'are identical insofar as they both seek to influence a mass audience in a way that is intended to benefit the sponsor'. 18 Another scholar believes that violence and propaganda constitute what is known as terrorism since 'Violence aims at behaviour modification by coercion. Propaganda aims at the same by persuasion.' It is important to note here that the use of symbols is one of the defining features of terrorist acts, as Thornton stresses: 'If the terrorist comprehends that he is seeking a demonstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum symbolic value.' 20 Karber also emphasizes that 'terrorism can be analyzed much like other media of communication' 21 due to its symbolic nature. As stated above, the terrorist act is not necessarily intended at the victims, but rather media consumers in order to instill fear in their hearts. 22 In other words, 'the skin on a drum [is] beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience'. 23 In this regard, Weimann and Winn 24 introduced the concept of the theater of terror in which they emphasized that terrorism is meant to disseminate a message by orchestrating violence. This is originally an idea borrowed from Jenkins, 25 who said that terrorism is similar to a choreographed act that aims at attracting attention.
On the other hand, Miller and Sabir distinguish between propaganda and mere communication of messages as they claim that more coercive forms of power like torture and killing 'can be examples of propaganda'. 26 Further, Rhonda Zaharna 27 mentions that it is important to distinguish between propaganda and public diplomacy as the former term is regarded as negative, while public diplomacy is usually run by governments and is meant to serve some good causes. Yet, many other scholars disagree with the above claims as both terrorism and propaganda are types of persuasive communication, and there remains a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and mass media. 'Each exploits the other and terrorism has no meaning without media coverage in this age of mass communication.' 28 In the following section, a detailed theoretical discussion is provided on the link between media and power and cultural resistance.
Mediated Power, Cultural Resistance and Humor
In relation to this study, a few theoretical concepts will be discussed especially the relation between media and power as well as cultural resistance and the use of humor. Many media and communication scholars believe that media and power are closely associated. Anthony Giddens, for example, states that power has a transformative capacity because it can change society. It is 'the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them'. 29 In other words, power is linked to change and media can be instrumental here in enlightening and leading people on how to enact this change. In this regard, John B. Thompson classifies power into four main forms: economic, political, coercive, and symbolic. 30 The latter involves media and communication means that is 
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used to exert influence and possibly control over others. As far as ISIS is concerned, the group seems to employ all these forms in varying manners and levels. Further and in relation to the symbolic power mentioned above, Fiske distinguishes between two types of power: semiotic and social. The first one is the power to 'construct meanings, pleasures, and social identities, and the power to construct a socioeconomic system'. 31 Media can be regarded as a symbolic and semiotic form of power because of its role in shaping reality in the minds of people. Nick Couldry further elaborates here by stressing that media is a complicated social process because of its 'symbolic power of 'constructing reality' (both factual representations and credible fictions)'.
32 Indeed, media is regarded as an emergent social power because the infrastructure of our modern society 'depends increasingly on the fast circulation of information and images. 33 In this regard, Van Dijk elaborates by emphasizing that:
Media power is generally symbolic and persuasive, in the sense that the media primarily have the potential to control to some extent the minds of readers or viewers, but not directly their actions. Except in cases of physical, coercive force, the control of action, which is usually the ultimate aim of the exercise of power, is generally indirect, whereas the control of intentions, plans, knowledge, beliefs, or opinions that is, mental representations that monitor overt activities is presupposed.
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In relation to the types of media power, James Curran 35 points out three main kinds of influence: economic, political, and cultural powers. The latter refers to counter-discourses that resist the powerful institution which could be linked to this study as different centralized and non-centralized media productions in the Middle East attempt to culturally resist ISIS's radical ideology. In his theory of mass-self communication, Manuel Castells argues that media 'are not the holders of power, but they constitute by and large the space where power is decided'. 36 In other words, media outlets are used as possible vehicles for power and counter-power. In the two cases, media can influence and have an impact on people, and ISIS uses media to counter the messages of the mainstream media as well as the general public, so this is regarded as counter-power. On the other hand, ISIS succeeds in many ways in disseminating its messages and sometimes persuading some individuals to join its ranks. As a result, the terrorist group will hold power over those it controls and its new recruits. Castells explains the binary nature of power by saying that all 'institutional systems reflect power relations, as well as the limits to these power relations as negotiated by a historical process of domination and counter-domination'. 37 In this context, the line that separate Castells' dichotomy in terms of power and counter-power is blurred here because power itself is continuously negotiated.
As for the concept of cultural resistance, media is used a vehicles to articulate a variety of resistances against hegemonic institutions and groups. The term itself was first introduced in the early twentieth century, and one of the earliest works that referred to this concept was written in 1922 by Henry Baerlein (1875-1960) on Slavic people. The author describes the Slavs' resistance of the German attempts to introduce Christianity into their lands in the ninth century, emphasizing 'the political and cultural resistance … against the State of the Franks. 38 The term itself is usually associated with foreign invasions' attempts to change the social fabric of certain nations and the struggle of the occupied, enslaved, or affected people to maintain their culture and traditional beliefs. 39 Cultural resistance is also used in other contexts. As Scott 40 claims, cultural resistance can be manifested as 'everyday forms of resistance' such as contesting the issues of personal identity, 41 religious values and discrimination, 42 gender, 43 race, 44 generational differences, 45 and sexual orientations. 46 Among the means used to express this kind of cultural resistance is, for example, rap music in the Cape Town area during the apartheid period 47 or subaltern press in South Africa. 48 Further, sports can also be used like playing baseball in the Caribbean which is regarded as a form of cultural resistance against Americanization and the influence of the dominant culture. 49 Due to the colonial heritage of many countries around the world, nationalism itself can be considered a form of cultural resistance.
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In this article, the focus is on traditional and social media, especially YouTube, employed as a cultural resistance tool. In general, the term is used in connection to the rejection of imported cultural beliefs that are regarded as a threat to the society and its people. As explained below, ISIS exerts power over many people and areas, so the group can be regarded as hegemonic, while the efforts of the anti-ISIS groups exhibit a form of cultural empowerment. Cultural resistance is employed to express resentment, mistrust, and animosity against the domineering culture that is represented by ISIS, and it becomes a venue against religious discrimination.
As Colleen Roach 51 mentions in her discussion of cultural imperialism and resistance, there is also resistance of the resistance in cultural studies which can also be applied in this study since there is always some kind of power shift; as usual, resistance is linked to the vulnerable or disenfranchised group. In this regard, Fiske asserts that counter-powers are 'not just oppositions to power, but [they are] the sources of power in their own right: they are the social points at which the powers of the subordinate are mostly clearly expressed'. 52 In this way, cultural resistance is the obvious 'refusal to accept the social identity proposed by the dominant ideology and the social control that goes with it'. 53 Finally, these counter-power movements can be manifested as a local, national, regional, and even international movement. In this context, Mittleman refers to the transnational or regional scope of some anti-hegemonic movements in terms of having 'collective resistance transcending national borders. 54 Based on the examples provided below, the anti-ISIS mocking videos and shows clearly have regional and international scope and audiences.
In addition, cultural resistance is manifested in the use of mediated humor. In particular, dark humor and satire seem relevant here. In relation to the former, it treats a morbid topic such as ISIS and its mediated savagery in an entertaining and funny manner. During and after times of crisis, human beings tend to express their fears in sometimes humorous ways such as the case of popular culture in post 9/11 America. 55 For this article, I borrowed Sorensen's definition of humor which 'means everything that causes amusement, from a joke, story, play, skit, movie or book, to a way of acting or a slogan in a demonstration. It can be based on irony, satire, parody, or ridicule. 56 In fact, humor, especially dark comedy, has been employed from the beginning of time in political resistance though its cost might be painful or deadly in some countries and historical periods, especially when dealing with totalitarian regimes.
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As for satire, numerous scholars have highlighted the way satire can be used as a form of non-violent resistance against hegemony and power control in different contexts. critiquing politics, and many well-known political leaders like the former Egyptian leader Jamal Abdul Nasser was not exempted from jokes and humorous attacks.
In addition to its entertainment quality, humor, in general, vents negative emotions and provides liberating feelings because it empowers people in expressing their frustrations towards the shortcomings of the political, religious, or social system. In this regard, Freud emphasized the aggressive nature of jokes and how they can have an impact on individuals, while other scholars discussed the importance of the incongruence elements in making jokes popular in different platforms including social media. 59 Further, Lindvall chronicles the history of humor and finds that each age has its own distinct type of religious satire. Here, a satirist is defined as a person who 'plays the role of a trickster, but with a purpose'. 60 Further, Kuipers 61 focuses on the importance of social background and globalization in perceiving good and bad humor. In other words, humor remains relative because it is bound by cultural values. For example, Lewis stresses that humor in the USA is viewed from partisan perspectives as it seems to be divisive, but he asserts that 'much of our joking has serious objectives that can elicit acquiescence or resistance'. 62 Also, the Danish cartoons that mocked Muhammed, the Prophet of Islam, were regarded as humorous by some in the West, yet the majority of Muslims' reactions towards these cartoons were 'totally devoid of any humor'. 63 As stated above, humor is a form of cultural resistance against hegemonic powers. For instance, the Serbian Otpor movement relied on humor to topple the rule Slobodan Miloševic´. 64 In his study of sarsart.org which contains digital artworks that were made as a reaction to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, Gillett stresses the importance of the Internet as a means for cultural resistance, stating: 'Like forms of cultural resistance generally, the Internet gives a forum for those who are silenced or marginalized to express their views publicly in ways that would not otherwise be available'. 65 Indeed, humor is regarded as an effective means of non-violent resistance, 66 and it is a universal trait as the use of humor to express political and cultural struggle or resistance is documented in Mexico, 67 Syria, 68 and Egypt during the Arab Spring. 69 It is also often used by African Americans as a way to assert their Black identity in a hegemonic white 59 culture. 70 I argue here that the numerous TV shows and YouTube videos that are called 'Salil Al Sawarem: The popular edition' that mock ISIS and its media productions function as cultural, religious, and political resistance against ISIS's ideology and its attempt to expand in other countries. The section below is focused on presenting these media productions that are related to anti-ISIS humor.
Non-violent Resistance Against ISIS
When ISIS advanced into parts of Iraq and Syria, it caused a huge humanitarian crisis because millions of people were forced to flee. 71 For example, thousands of Yazidi women from Iraq were enslaved and raped by the group. 72 As it is well publicized, ISIS's expansion was met with armed confrontation from a US-led Coalition as well as Shiite militias and the Iraqi army. However, there are numerous other non-military and non-violent types of resistance against ISIS, 73 which are regarded as forms of cultural resistance that will be the focus of this study. For example, GhostSec, which is a hacking group involving many Arabs from various countries, has been formed whose goal is to attack ISIS's websites and social media accounts in what is described as a 'counter-terrorism operation'. 74 According to its website, the group's 'mission is to eliminate the online presence of Islamic extremist groups … in an effort to stymie their recruitment and limit their ability to organize international terrorist efforts. 75 Also, the hacktivist group, Anonymous, announced its ongoing online attacks against ISIS's websites and its followers on Twitter. The group was allegedly successful in taking down over 750 Twitter accounts, some of which had more than 10,000 followers.
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Other forms of cultural resistance include the case of Aeham Ahmed, a Palestinian refugee whose piano was destroyed by ISIS when they advanced into Yarmouk city, a refugee enclave in Syria. ISIS burnt Aeham's piano because music is regarded as a sin, and they threatened to kill him, saying: 'Shut up or I will throw you on top and burn you along with it!'. Instead of complying, Aeham continued playing music on his keyboard despite the risks because 'music brings peace', according to him. 77 Similar to Aeham Ahmed, an Iraqi artist called Akeel Khreef used old and torn shoes to mock ISIS. The artist admits that his non-violent means of countering the terrorist group 'will not get The cartoon mocks the stupidity of ISIS members and is regarded as an attack against the alleged support ISIS gets from some Gulf Arab countries.
In relation to social media use, there are many other efforts to counter ISIS's ideology such as the famous Twitter account that is called 'ISIS Karaoke' (twitter.com/isis_karaoke) which comically shows ISIS fighters signing love songs instead of delivering their threatening speeches. Another campaign that became viral is a Twitter hashtag called #SorryISIS in which people from around the world started mocking ISIS for its call to join the group. However, it also led to suspending the Twitter account of an Arab Spring activist whose name was Iyad El Baghdadi.
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In fact, the viral campaigns against ISIS were not only global but also national. For example, the comedy show, Saturday Night Live, once featured Dakota Johnston as a young girl who says goodbye to her father in order to join ISIS. 81 Another viral video posted from Mexico showed a group of Mexican men parodying an ISIS execution scene. 82 Also, the hacktivist group Anonymous announced on 11 December 2015 its #trollingday campaign in which the group urged its followers to use the hashtag #Daeshbags in order to mock ISIS on social media. The original idea began when the bulletin board 4chan showed how they superimposed duck heads on the pictures of Isis fighters.
83 Anonymous later explained that the idea behind organizing the campaign was related to showing ISIS that 'we are not afraid, we will not just hide in our fear, we are the majority and with our strength in numbers we can make a real difference'. 84 In this campaign, three recurrent themes were highlighted such as claiming that ISIS members were 'secretly gay, that they like to have sex with goats, or something to do with rubber ducks. 85 Indeed, there are numerous other examples that ridiculed ISIS which can be found in different parts of the world; many of them can be categorized as forms of cultural resistance against ISIS's ideology. This article examines another type of cultural resistance ISIS faces in different Arab countries by focusing on TV shows and YouTube videos, as will be explained below. The Anti-ISIS Videos By using the search term 'Salil Al Sawarem' in Arabic on 9 September 2015, the top ten videos dealing with anti-ISIS humor were selected based on their number of views (see Table 1 ). The results were recorded on the same day because social media data changes with time, and since this is a qualitative study that relies on interpretive assessment, the quantitative part is only used to provide an overview of the top videos that deal with anti-ISIS humor. Only the top videos are included because there are hundreds of similar clips that have not garnered the same public attention. YouTube is selected because of its popularity and the fact that it is a global video platform. 86 There are numerous qualitative and quantitative studies that used popular YouTube videos and comments in order to assess the online public's views and sentiments towards social movements, trends, and important world events. Most of the anti-ISIS videos examined in this study seem to be edited and dubbed as they are taken from various older movies and songs performed by a variety of Arab actors and singers. Video clip (1) got the highest number of views (888,852), dislikes (1899), as well as comments and replies (1022). This video uses the term DAESH which is the Arabic acronym of ISIS, a term detested by the terrorist group. It features a famous belly dancer called Saffynaz, dancing on the tunes of the edited version of ISIS's 'Salil Al-Sawarem' (see Figure 1) . One of the reasons behind this high number of dislikes is the belief that the clip is profane since ISIS uses Islamic terms in its chant. In total, the top ten videos generated 2,941,287 views, 7,757 likes (63.5 per cent), 4,448 dislikes (36.4 per cent), and 2,228 comments and replies which indicate the high amount of public engagement.
Based on the figures provided above, these decentralized anti-ISIS and humorous videos are engaging and effective public diplomacy efforts against this terrorist group. In this regard, Philip Seib discusses how public diplomacy or soft power can be used to counter terrorism. He says, for example, that the production of the Palestinian Shara'a Simsim that started airing in 2006 as an adaptation of Sesame Street became a crucial tool in countering violent ideology. The same children's show was also used in other places like Northern Ireland and Kosovo that witnessed previous violence. 88 In this regard, the Saudi government has been running the Assakina Campaign for Dialogue that is supervised by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The media campaign aims at discrediting extremist ideology by engaging radical youth in religious debates. 89 Further, the Jordanian government ran a public campaign against Al-Qaeda after the 2005 hotel bombing in Amman, 90 and Bashar Assad's regime in Syria frequently aired public awareness ads to counter religious extremism. Another popular anti-ISIS TV series was produced by the Iraqi national television, Al Iraqiya. It is called 'The Mythical State' (Doulatt al-Khuraffa) which is an intended distortion of 'The Caliphate State' (Doulatt Al-Khilaffa). The series' trailer highlights Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as can be seen in Image (3), and its main goal is to ridicule ISIS and its ideology. 96 In relation to the concept of cultural resistance, the series' director, Ali Al-Qasim, stated: 'We are not good at carrying arms, but we know how to undermine ISIS's ideology with our work'. 97 The Iraqi TV show also 'took a jab at the CIA, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies, a trio that many Iraqis hold responsible for the rise of the demonic group'. 98 Finally, the Lebanese TV station, LBC, aired a TV series show called 'Kttir Selbi' (Very Negative) in which ISIS fighters are presented in awkward situations and are made fun of especially in relation to the contrast between their extremist ideology that enforces female niqab and encounters with women that often allude to sex. For example, in one show some ISIS fighters plan to assassinate the famous Lebanese singer, Haifa Wahbi, but they completely change their minds after seeing her sexy body and moves (see Figure 4) . In another show, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is presented getting a shoulder message by an attractive young woman wearing a short "dress" (see Figure 5) . In this regard, the Lebanese producer, Nabil Assaf, stated that ISIS fighters 'are not a true
